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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
Claimant/Appellant, Francisco Serrano ("Claimant"), is represented by Richard 
Hammond of Caldwell, Idaho. Respondents/Defendants, Four Seasons Framing 
("Employer"), and Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation ("Surety"), are represented by 
Kent W. Day of Boise, Idaho. 
This matter was heard on July 28, 2011, before the Industrial Commission of the 
State of Idaho ("Commission"), sitting en bane. A post-hearing deposition of Dr. Timothy 
Doerr was undertaken by Defendants on December 21, 2011. A.R. Vol. II, p. 312. The 
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendations 
("Decision"), dated March 20, 2013. A.R. Vol. II, p. 310-342. The Commission received 
Claimant's Notice of Appeal filed April 30,2013 and Claimant's Amended Notice of Appeal 
filed July 17, 2013. A.R. Vol. II, p. 343-347. 
II. Course of Proceedings Below 
Claimant filed Worker's Compensation Complaints alleging two industrial separate 
industrial accidents. Claimant filed his first Complaint on December 23, 2008, for an 
industrial injury sustained on January 13, 2004. As of January 22, 2009, the date 
Defendants filed their Answer to Claimant's Complaint for the 2004 injury, Surety had 
paid out $7,810.26 in TTD benefits and $32,486.84 in medical benefits on Claimant's 
behaif for the January 16, 2004 injury. A.R. Vol. I, p. 1-5. Claimant's second Complaint 
was filed on July 27, 2011, for an industrial injury sustained on January 28,2008.1 As of 
1 Just ONE day prior to hearing on Claimant's 2004 injury, Claimant filed his complaint for his January 28, 
2008, injury. Defendants reasonably could have objected to consideration of the 2008 claim at hearing, 
however, in the interest of judicial economy, Defendants agreed to the inclusion of the 2008 claim. 
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July 28, 2011, Surety had paid $9,213.80 in TTD benefits and $18,175.70 in medical 
benefits on Claimant's behalf for his 2008 injury. AR. Vol. II, p. 285. Claimant's 
Complaints were consolidated by Order of the Commission dated August 2, 2011. AR. 
Vol. II, p. 286. 
The Commission conducted a hearing July 28, 2011. AR. Vol. II, p. 310. By 
agreement of the parties at hearing, the issues to be decided were: 
A. Claimant's entitlement to additional temporary partial or temporary total 
disability benefits (TPDITTD); 
B. Claimant's entitlement to additional medical care benefits pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 72-432; 
C. Claimant's entitlement to permanent partial impairment benefits (PPI); and 
D. Claimant's entitlement to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-804. 
AR. Vol. II, p. 311 (emphasis added). The post-hearing deposition of Timothy E, Doerr, 
M.D., was undertaken by Defendants on December 1, 2011. AR. Vol. I, p. 24. The 
parties submitted post-hearing briefs and the Commission took the matter under 
advisement on July 26, 2012. AR. Vol. II, p. 310. Upon the record introduced at hearing, 
the post-hearing deposition testimony of Timothy E. Doerr, M.D., and the post-hearing 
briefing submitted by the parties, the Commission issued its Decision, dated March 20, 
2013. A.R. Vol. II, p. 310-342. The Commission specifically found that, as a matter offact, 
Claimant failed to prove that the condition for which he claimed benefits was caused by 
either his 2004 or 2008 industrial accident. All other issues were rendered moot. AR. Vol. 
II, p. 340-341. Claimant filed his Notice of Appeal on April 30, 2013. AR. Vol. II, p. 343-
347. 
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III. Statement of Facts 
A. The January 16, 2004, Industrial Accident 
Claimant began working for Employer as a framer on September 10, 2001. He 
worked 40-45 hours per week. On January 16, 2004, Claimant was working on a 
roof at a construction site when he fell to the ground from a height of approximately 
fifteen feet, landing on his side. Claimant did not hit his head when he fell, nor did 
he lose consciousness, and was able to ambulate after his fall. He was transported 
by private vehicle to St. Luke's Regional Medical Center Emergency Department in 
Boise, where he reported pain in his hips and on the right side of his body. A CT 
scan revealed transverse process fractures at L2 and L3 and a mildly displace left 
inferior pubic ramus fracture. Claimant was then transferred by ambulance to St. 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("SARMC"), for surgical consultation and was 
admitted for observation and pain control by Scott Henson, M.D. Dr. Henson 
consulted with Dr. Timothy Doerr, M.D., a spinal surgeon, about Claimant's 
transverse process fractures and was informed that no surgical intervention was 
necessary. Dr. Henson next consulted with Dr. James Johnston, M.D., an 
orthopedic surgeon, for Claimant's pelvic injury. Dr. Johnston determined that 
Claimant's pelvic injury did not require surgery, and could be managed with weight 
bearing as tolerated and temporary work restrictions. Claimant was discharged 
from the hospital on January 17, 2004, with instructions to see Dr. Johnston for 
follow-up on January 22, 2004. 
Claimant presented to Dr. Johnston on January 22, complaining of pelvic pain and 
significant right shoulder pain, especially with overhead activities. Upon physical 
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examination, Dr. Johnston noted trace tenderness of the lumbar spine on the right and 
positive impingement signs in Claimant's right shoulder. Def. Exh. I, p. 67, (emphasis 
added). Dr. Johnston diagnosed traumatic onset impingement syndrome, noting that if the 
pain persisted he would order shoulder x-rays and possible a subacromial steroid injection. 
At re-check on February 12, 2004, Claimant's major complaints were shoulder 
and rib pain, but he also reported numerous other symptoms, including mild to 
moderate low back pain. During examination, Dr. Johnston observed a mild lumbar 
spasm, rib tenderness, and positive impingement findings on the right shoulder. 
Shoulder x-rays were obtained which revealed a Type II-I" acromion, consistent with 
impingement syndrome. Claimant's lumbar pain was attributed to his transverse 
process fractures and the left groin pain from the pelvic fracture, both of which were 
predicted to resolve uneventfully. Id., p. 69. Claimant's right shoulder subacromial 
space was injected with Betamethasone/Marcaine and follow-up was scheduled in two 
weeks. On February 26, 2004, Claimant informed Dr. Johnston that the shoulder 
injection had provided no relief and he continued to have pain in his hip and ribs and 
significant pain in his shoulder. No back pain was noted at this office visit. Dr. Johnston 
told Claimant that his hip and rib pain would resolve slowly over the course of several 
weeks or even months and required no treatment beyond stretching exercises. For 
Claimant's shoulder, Dr. Johnston recommended surgery, as he believed that 
Claimant's shoulder symptoms were unlikely to resolve through continued conservative 
treatment. 
Arthroscopic decompression including acromioplasty and distal clavicle resection 
was performed by Dr. Johnston on March 19, 2004. At his first post-operative exam on 
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March 25, 2004, Dr. Johnston noted that Claimant was ready to proceed to physical 
therapy for both his right shoulder and his low back problems. Id., p. 74. Claimant's 
shoulder progressed well in physical therapy, but his low back pain persisted. An MRI 
of the lumbar spine, taken April 28, 2004, revealed the following: 1) at L4-L5, minimal 
posterior non-compressive annular disc bulging and disc dessication; 2) at L5-S 1, 
degenerative disc disease, posterior annular disc bulging, central/left paramedian 
subligamentous disc protrusion, possible minimal impingement of the left S1 nerve root, 
non-compressive neural foraminal narrowing and facet arthrosis. In discussion with 
Claimant on May 4, 2004, Dr. Johnston interpreted the MRI to show mild degenerative 
changes without nerve root impingement. Id., p. 77. The treatment plan was to return 
Claimant to light duty work in a week and a half, and to full work in one month. Re-
check was scheduled for one month. On May 20, 2004, Claimant presented to Dr. 
Johnston complaining that work was aggravating his back pain. While Dr. Johnston 
noted that most of Claimant's pain was probably from degenerative changes, there was 
a possibility of a truly symptomatic disc problem. He referred Claimant to pain specialist, 
Dr. Sandra Thompson, for epidural steroid injections. Id., p. 80. 
Claimant received two epidural steroid injections from Dr. Thompson, which 
succeeded in alleviating Claimant's back pain. On June 28, 2004, noting that Claimant 
had experienced no back pain since receiving his injections, Dr. Johnston determined 
Claimant was medically stable with no permanent impairment. Id., p. 83-84. 
On November 16, 2004, Claimant returned to Dr. Johnston with complaints of 
severe back pain. Noting concern that Claimant's "previous MRI findings of 
degenerative disc disease with disc bulge/herniation may have progressed," Dr. 
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Johnston referred Claimant to Dr. Tim Floyd for further evaluation. Id., p. 85. 
After November 16, 2004, Claimant saw no further medical providers for his back 
pain. Jr. 73, lines 13-15. In response to Surety's May, 2005, letter, Dr. Johnston 
indicated Claimant's disc pathology was almost certainly pre-existing, but was also 
exacerbated by his fall from the roof on January 16, 2004. Id., p. 88. Dr. Johnston did 
not provide any additional information as to whether the exacerbation was temporary or 
permanent, but he did not revise his finding that Claimant suffered no permanent 
impairment from the 2004 industrial injury. Def. Exh. I, p. 83-84, 88. Claimant was 
able to return to his time-of-injury position with Employer working full time 
without restrictions. A.R. Vol. I, p. 5. 
B. The January 28, 2008, Industrial Accident 
On January 28, 2008, Claimant slipped and fell on ice while at work, landing on 
his back. Claimant did not seek any medical treatment related to the fall until, on 
February 4, 2008, he presented to the St. Alphonsus emergency department 
complaining of back pain. At that time Claimant was diagnosed with acute myofascial 
strain and acute onset low back pain. Medication was prescribed and Claimant was 
released. On February 6, 2008, Claimant sought additional medical treatment from Dr. 
Joseph Verska, M.D., complaining of low back pain and bilateral leg pain, numbness 
and tingling. Radiographs of Claimant's lumbar spine were taken, revealing an 
osteophyte and moderate disc space narrowing at L5-S1. Dr. Verska diagnosed 
sciatica, degenerative disc disease, and a herniated disc, and ordered an MRI. The 
MRI taken February 21, 2008, was compared to the April, 2004, MRI. The 
radiologist reported as follows: 1) minor L4-L5 degenerative changes, unchanged from 
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prior study; and 2) mild/moderate degenerative changes at L5-S1 with central disc 
herniation and minor left greater than right foraminal stenosis, unchanged from prior 
study. Def. Exh. G, p. 608 (emphasis added). 
Claimant presented for MRI review and discussion with Dr. Verska on February 
28, 2008. Dr. Verska interpreted the 2008 MRI as showing some degenerative changes 
at L5-S1 with a central canal herniation at L5-S1, and told Claimant he did not believe 
surgery was indicated. D. E. 0, p. 228. Claimant was referred to Dr. 8eth Rodgers, 
M.D., for epidural steroid injections at Dr. Verska's recommendation. Claimant declined 
to receive any injections from Dr. Rodgers, and on April 2, 2008, Dr. Verska offered 
Claimant a microdiscectomy at L5-S1 on the left, upon receipt of approval from Surety. 
Id., p. 232. 
Dr. Verska performed a surgical consult/evaluation on April 16, 2008, ultimately 
determining that Claimant did not need surgery because Claimant's symptoms were not 
bad enough and Claimant had no motor or sensory deficits or reflex changes to indicate 
ongoing radiculopathy. Noting that Claimant desired to have surgical intervention, Dr. 
Verska opined that he did not believe Claimant would do well with the desired operation, 
and referred him to Dr. Timothy Doerr, M.D., for a second opinion on surgery, and to Dr. 
8eth Rodgers for an impairment rating. Id., p. 234. 
Claimant saw Dr. Rogers for an impairment rating on April 21, 2008. A!though 
the Commission later found Dr. Rogers' impairment rating of 6% attributable solely to 
the 2008 accident lacked credibilitl, several comments in her report are worthy of note. 
2 Dr. Rogers did not refer to the 2004 MRI in her report, and apparently based her rating on the 2008 MRI 
only. Thus, the Commission determined that her opinion that Claimant's disc herniation at LS-S1 was 
attributable only to the 2008 accident was not credible, as the disc herniation appeared on the 2004 MRI. 
As such, it was a pre-existing condition. A.R. p. 330. 
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Specifically, although Dr. Rogers found Claimant had a documented single-level disc 
protrusion at L5-S1 , she also opined that Claimant exhibited some non-verifiable or 
inconsistent radicular complaints, and somewhat inconsistent symptoms. His 
straight leg raise test was negative, and sensory findings were inconsistent. 
Claimant had normal motor strength and no significant lower extremity atrophy. On 
initial clinical presentation Claimant documented pain in an appropriate distribution, 
however there were inconsistencies on exam. Def. Exh. 0, p. 237-238 (emphasis 
added). 
Claimant presented to Dr. Doerr on April 22, 2008, for a second opinion on 
surgical intervention. Dr. Doerr noted that Claimant had a previous work injury in 2004 
and was doing well until a repeat injury on January 28, 2008. Since the 2008 injury 
Claimant complained of back pain radiating into both legs with intermittent numbness 
bilaterally but no weakness, and no change in bowel/bladder function. Def. Exh. P, p. 
243. After examining Claimant and reviewing the 2008 MRI, Dr. Doerr opined that 
Claimant's low back pain was most likely caused by his degenerative changes at LS-S1 
greater than L4-5. Further, as Claimant exhibited no significant neurological 
impingement, Dr. Doerr did not advise any surgical intervention, but did recommend 
physical therapy in the form of a physiatry-directed rehab program with a goal of rapid 
reintegration into the workplace. In the event Claimant's symptoms were not controlled 
with formal rehabilitation, Dr. Doerr recommended re-evaluation by a spine surgeon in 
eight to twelve weeks. Id. 
Thereafter, Claimant began a physical therapy regime, however returned to Dr. 
Doerr on June 6, 2008, reporting that the physical therapy did not relieve his pain. 
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Based upon Claimant's six month period of persistent symptoms despite anti-
inflammatories, activity modifications and physical therapy, Dr. Doerr felt a discogram of 
the lumbar spine from L3 to the sacrum was warranted. Def.Exh. P, p. 248. Claimant 
underwent a discogram performed by Dr. Sandra Thompson on July 17, 2008, which 
was negative at L3-4 and negative at L4-S. The LS-S1 level could not be accessed. 
Thereafter, Dr. Doerr performed a series of two bilateral transforaminal epidural steroid 
injections, neither of which provided Claimant with improvement in his symptoms. Dr. 
Doerr then recommended a repeat discogram in an attempt to access the LS-S1 level. 
Def. Exh. P, p.249-253. 
On September 8, 2008, Claimant underwent a repeat discogram at the L4-S and 
LS-S 1 levels, performed by Dr. William Binegar. Def. Exh. H, p. 65K-65L. Dr. Binegar's 
operative note indicates a normal pattern at level L4-S, with no pain noted during the 
injection and no extravasation of dye noted, therefore the interpretation by Dr. Binegar 
was that disk L4-S was not contributing to Claimant's pain. However, he noted the 
following during the same procedure for level LS-S 1 : 
At this level prior to the injection of any dye Mr. Serrano began noting 
some pain and pressure. He indicated this persisted for some time before 
I even injected any dye. We talked to him some more and he finally 
indicated he was not having increasing pain. I then continued with the 
procedure, where we started again fluoroscopy and I then began the 
injection of dye. During the entire time of the injection he indicated minor 
pain and minor pressure. At no time during the injection did he indicate 
any significant pain. The maximum pressure I obtained was 43 psi. I did 
inject 3.S cc of dye. This did reveal a degenerative pattern with a fissure 
noted on the right. vVhen I informed Mr. Serrano that we finished he then 
indicates his pain level is now suddenly a 7/10 to 8/10. I repeated 
injection of dye of approximately 0.3 cc and during this repeat injection he 
did not indicate increased pain. The interpreter is present during this 
entire time of dye injection of both disks. 
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At this level there really is not pain noted during the injection of dye. Only 
at the end of the injection of dye does Mr. Serrano indicate any pain. 
There is a noted right-sided fissure. I feel this discogram is indeterminate 
for determining if this L5-S1 disk is contributing to his pain. I felt Mr. 
Serrano was somewhat unreliable in his presentation indicating pain 
even prior to the injection of dye at this level. Also I will state during 
the entire injection process he kept asking which disk we were 
doing, He wanted to know if it was the disc that they had trouble 
getting into before. He wanted to know if it was disk level 1 or disk 
level 2. Again, my interpretation at this time is the L5-S1 discogram is 
indeterminant for determining if the L5-S1 disk is contributing to Mr. 
Serrano's typical low back pain." 
Def. Exh. H, p. 65K-65L (emphasis added). Claimant saw Dr. Doerr on September 16, 
2008, to review his discogram results. Def. Exh. 0, p. 260. The following remarks in 
Dr. Doerr's chart note from that visit are enlightening: 
On examination today, he has 60 degrees forward flexion and 30 degrees 
extension of the lumbar spine. He has 30 degrees right side bending and 
30 degrees left side bending. He has 5/5 strength bilateral iliopsoas, 
quadriceps, tibialis anterior, extensor halluces longus, gastrocnemius-
soleus and hamstrings. Light touch is intact and symmetrical L2 to S1. 
Discogram of the lumbar spine from 09/08/08 was negative at L4-5 and 
indeterminate at LS-S1 with the patient's responses concerning for 
possible nonorganic symptoms. I personally discussed the 
discogram results with Dr. Binegar who performed the discogram, 
who was in agreement that it is unlikely that L4-S and LS-S1 is 
contributing to any of Francisco's symptoms. 
At this point Francisco has gone through one month (Dr. Doerr 
acknowledged during his deposition that this was a clerical mistake in the 
chart note and that it should have said "eight months") of conservative 
treatment including anti-inflammatories, activity modification, physical 
therapy, bilateral L5 transforaminal epidural steroid injection x2. His 
discogram reveals no definitive discogenic source for his symptoms. At 
this point I believe that he is at maximum medical improvement. I do not 
see any objective evidence to support any work restrictions at this time. 
He has 0 percent permanent partial impairment. 
Def. Exh. P, p. 260 (emphasis added). See a/so, Doerr Depo, p. 13, lines 9-12. 
Following this appointment, Surety ceased paying benefits on Claimant's 2008 claim. 
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On October 5, 2008, Claimant suffered pain when he felt a pop in his back and 
fell to the floor after attempting to rise from a couch. He was transported by ambulance 
to St. Alphonsus emergency department. An MRI was performed, revealing mild L4-L5 
disc dessication with no central canal or foraminal stenosis, and mild disc bulging at L5-
S1 with no central canal or foraminal stenosis. The interpreting radiologist did not 
compare it to either the 2004 MRI or the 2008 MRI. The treating ER physician opined 
that Claimant's pain seemed to be related to lumbar disc disease. Def. Exh. F, p. 48K. 
Claimant was admitted to the hospital for pain control and received treatment from Dr. 
Kenneth Little, M.D. An evaluation found no acute injury and Claimant was released to 
follow up with Dr. Thompson for pain management. During 2009 and 2010 Dr. 
Thompson treated Claimant with pain medications, ultimately referring Claimant to Dr. 
Michael Hajjar, M.D., for consultation. Def Exh. Q, p. 262-286. Dr. Hajjar opined that 
Claimant might be a potential candidate for further lumbar treatment or intervention, but 
wanted new studies done to determine appropriate treatment. Claimant did not follow up 
with Dr. Hajjar due to financial issues. A.R. Vol. II, p. 334-335. 
After the 2008 accident, Claimant ceased working for Four Seasons Framing. 
Claimant began working as a landscaper in 2009, continuing to do so at the time of 
hearing. Tr., p. 54, lines 4-13, p. 55, lines 1-5. 
This matter was heard on July 28, 2011, before the Industrial Commission of the 
State of Idaho ("Commission"), sitting en banco A post-hearing deposition of Dr. Timothy 
Doerr was undertaken by Defendants on December 21 ,2011. A.R. Vol. II, p. 312. 
The case was taken under advisement by the Commission on July 26, 2012. After 
thorough consideration of the testimonial and documentary evidence in the record, as well 
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as the briefs of the parties, the Commission held that Claimant failed to prove that the 
condition for which he claimed benefits was caused either by his 2004 industrial accident 
or his 2008 industrial accident. Because he failed to prove causation, he failed to prove 
entitlement to additional benefits. Having failed to show entitlement to additional benefits, 
he also failed to show that Defendants unreasonably denied or delayed payment of 
benefits. Therefore, Claimant was not entitled to attorney fees. Other issues were deemed 
moot. AR. Vol. fI, p. 340-341. 
Claimant timely filed his Notice of Appeal under I.C. §72-1368(9) and I.A.R 14(b) 
on April 30, 2013, alleging six (6) issues to be decided on appeal. AR. Vol. fI, p.343-347. 
The Industrial Commission filed a Notice of Completion of Agency Record (and mailing to 
the parties) on May 24,2013. A.R. Vol. fI, p. 352-353. On June 18,2013, Claimant then 
filed his Objection And Motion To Augment The Agency Record under I.A.R. 28 and 
29(a). AR. Vol. !fI, p. 354-357. On July 8, 2013, the Industrial Commission filed its Order 
Regarding Claimant's Request To Augment The Agency Record, and its Order Settling 
Record. AR. Vol. 1/1, p. 358-369. 
Claimant next filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on July 17, 2013, alleging seven 
(7) issues to be decided on appeal. On July 23, 2013, Defendants filed a Motion To Limit 
Issues and Brief In Support contending the Court should limit the issues to be heard to 
issues "1(c) through (g)" as set forth in Claimant's Amended Notice of Appeal. Claimant 
filed his Brief in Opposition of Defendants' Motion on July 31,2013. Claimant next filed a 
Motion For Permission To Exceed 50 Pages and to Extend Briefing Schedule on 
September 20, 2013. Defendants filed a Motion To Extend Briefing Schedule And 
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Response To Claimant's Motion For Permission To Exceed 50 Pages on September 25, 
2013. 
IV. Issues on Appeal 
A. Whether the Commission committed legal error or abused its 
discretion by denying Claimant's Motion for Protective Order on 
February 23, 2010, Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration on 
December 21, 2010, or Claimant's Renewed Motion for Protective 
Order, Motion for Reconsideration and Sanctions on February 24, 
2011 . 
B. Whether the Commission committed legal error or abused its 
discretion by striking Claimant's claim for disability benefits as a 
sanction for Claimant's refusal to provide Defendants with a response 
to relevant discovery intended to ascertain Claimant's immigration 
status in its Order dated September 7, 2010 
C. Whether the Commission committed legal error or abused its 
discretion by admitting into evidence and considering the testimony 
and deposition of Dr. Timothy Doerr over Claimant's objections 
D. Whether, upon the record in its entirety, there is substantial and 
competent evidence to support the Commission's factual 
determination that Claimant failed to prove that the condition for 
which he claimed benefits was caused either by his 2004 or 2008 
industrial accident and therefore was not entitled to further medical or 
indemnity benefits or attorney fees 
E. Whether the Commission committed legal error or abused its 
discretion by issuing its July 8, 2013 Order Regarding Claimant's 
Request to Augment the Record 
F. Whether to grant Claimant's request for an award of attorney fees 
under I.C. §72-804, I.A.R. 11.2, or I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(1) 
G. Whether to grant Defendants' request for an award of costs on 
appeal under I.C. §12-121 and/or I.A.R. 41 
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ARGUMENT 
I. RELEVANT LAW 
A. BURDEN OF PROOF/CAUSATION 
It is well-settled law the claimant in a workers compensation case has the burden 
of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to benefits. Evans v. 
Hara's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473,479,849 P.2d 934, 940 (1993). The Claimant must prove 
not only that he was injured, but also that his injury was the result of an accident arising 
out of and in the course of his employment. Neufeld v. Browning Ferris Industries, 109 
Idaho 899, 902, 712 P.2d 600, 603 (1985); see also Cole v. Stokely Van Camp, 118 
Idaho 173, 175, 795 P.2d 872, 874 (1990), Dinius v. Loving Care and More, Inc., 133 
Idaho 572, 990 P.2d 738 (1999), and Reinstein v. McGregor Land & Livestock, 126 
Idaho 156, 158,879 P.2d 1089, 1091 (1994). 
The proof presented by a claimant must establish a probable - not merely a 
possible - connection, or causal link, between cause and effect to support the 
contention he suffered a compensable accident. Cal/antine v. Blue Ribbon Linen 
Supply, 103 Idaho 734, 735, 653 P.2d 455, 456 (1982); Beardsley v. Idaho Forest 
Industries, 127 Idaho 404, 406, 901 P.2d 511, 513 (1995). "Probable" is defined as 
"having more evidence for than against." Fisher v. Bunker Hill Co., 96 Idaho 341, 344, 
528 P.2d 903, 906 (1974). A claimant also must provide medical testimony that 
supports a claim for compensation to a reasonable degree of medical probability. 
Langley v. State of Idaho Industrial Spedallndemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 785,890 P. 
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2d 732, 736 (1995). An employer is not liable for medical treatment that is not causally 
related to an industrial accident. Sweeney v. Great West Transp., 110 Idaho 67,71,714 
P.2d 36, 40 (1986); Williamson v. Whitman Corp.lPet, Inc. 130 Idaho 602, 944 P.2d 
1365 (1997); Matthew v. Dept. of Corrections, 121 Idaho 680, 827 P.2d 693 (1992). 
B. EVIDENTIARY RULINGS 
Strict adherence to the rules of evidence is not required in Industrial Commission 
proceedings and admission of evidence in such proceedings is more relaxed. Stolle v. 
Bennett, 144 Idaho 44, 49, 156 P.3d 545, 550 (2007) (citing Hagler v. Micron Technology, 
Inc., 118 Idaho 596, 598, 798 P.2d 55, 57 (1990) (emphasis in original)). When the 
Legislature created the Commission, it intended that proceedings before it be as 
"summary, economical, and simple as the rules of equity would allow." Stolle, 144 Idaho at 
50, 156 P.3d at 551 (citing Hite v. Kulhenak Bldg. Contractor, 96 Idaho 70, 72, 524 P.2d 
531,533 (1974)). The Commission should have the discretionary power to consider any 
type of reliable evidence having probative value, even though that evidence may not be 
admissible in a court of law. Stolle v. Bennett, supra. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS 
In reviewing decisions of the Industrial Commission on appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court, Idaho Code §72-732 sets forth the standard of review: 
DISPOSITiON OF APPEAL - JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT. 
Upon hearing the court may affirm or set aside such order or award, or may 
set it aside only upon any of the following grounds: 
(1) The commission's findings of fact are not based on any substantial 
competent evidence; 
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(2) The commission has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its 
powers; 
(3) The findings of fact, order or award were procured by fraud; 
(4) The findings of fact do not as a matter of law support the order or 
award. 
I.C. §72-732. In other words, "[t]he Commission has wide discretion in making factual 
determinations regarding worker's compensation claims." Magee v. Thompson Creek 
Mining Company, 152 Idaho 196, 200, 268 P.3d 464, 468 (2012) (quoting Mulder v. 
Uberty Nw. Ins. Co., 135 Idaho 52, 55, 14 P.3d 372, 375 (2000)). The Court will not 
disturb the Commission's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. Magee v. Thompson Creek Min.Co., 
152 Idaho at 201, 268 P .3d at 469 (citing Ewins v. Allied Sec., 138 Idaho 343, 346, 63 
P.3d 472 (2003)). Nevertheless, the Court exercises free review over the Commission's 
legal conclusions. Id. 
B. EVIDENTIARY RULINGS 
The Court reviews challenges to a trial court's evidentiary rulings under the abuse 
of discretion standard. Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 134 Idaho 46, 50, 
995 P.2d 816, 820 (2000) (citing Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825, 827, 828 P.2d 854, 
856 (1992)). These include trial court decisions admitting or excluding expert witness 
testimony. Id. (citing Morris By and Through /lAorris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138, 144, 937 
P.2d 1212, 1218 (1997)). When reviewing a lower court or agency's discretionary 
deciSion, this Court must conduct a three-part inquiry to determine whether the lower court 
or agency abused its discretion. A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly 
perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applied 
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the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason. 
Magee v. Thompson Creek Min. Co., 152 Idaho 196, 200, 268 P.3d 464, 468 (2012) 
(citing West Wood Invs., Inc., v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 82,106 P.3d 401, 408 (2005)). 
C. CREDIBILITY OF CLAIMANT 
When the Industrial Commission is presented with conflicting testimony at 
hearing, it is incumbent upon the Industrial Commission to determine the credibility of 
the witnesses to determine which testimony is to believed. 
The rule applicable to all witnesses, whether parties or interested in the 
event of an action, is, that either a board, court, or jury must accept as true 
the positive, uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness, unless his 
testimony is inherently improbable, or rendered so by facts and 
circumstances disclosed at the hearing or trial. ... [N]either the trial court 
nor a jury may arbitrarily or capriciously disregard the testimony of a 
witness unimpeached by any of the modes known to the law, if such 
testimony does not exceed probability .... Testimony which is inherently 
improbable may be disregarded ... but to warrant such action there must 
exist either a physical impossibility of the evidence being true, or its falsity 
must be apparent, without any resort to inferences or deductions. (Internal 
citations omitted). 
Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620,626-27,603 P.2d 575, 581-82 (1979) (citing Pierstorff 
v. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 447-48, 74 P.2d 171, 175 (1937)). If evidence is 
controverted, then it is up to the Commission to determine which testimony is more 
credible. The Industrial Commission is the arbitrator of conflicting evidence and if the 
Commission's determination is supported by substantial and competent, though 
conflicting, evidence, it will not be disturbed on appeal. Calantine, 103 Idaho 734 (citing 
Hamby v. Simp/ot, Co., 94 Idaho 794, 498 P.2d 1267 (1972)). 
III. ISSUE ANALYSIS 
A. THE COMMISSION DID NOT COMMIT LEGAL ERROR OR ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY DENYING CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
ON FEBRUARY 23, 2010, CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON 
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DECEMBER 21, 2010, ANDIOR CLAIMANT'S RENEWED MOTION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER, MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND SANCTIONS 
ON FEBRUARY 24, 2011 
The Commission's full analysis that lead to their denial of these motions is set forth 
in detail in it's orders of September 7,2010, A.R., Vol. I, p. 77-85, and December 21, 2010, 
A.R., Vol. I, p. 135-140,. and won't be rehashed here in detail. Defendants believe the 
Commissions orders should be affirmed by this Court. In a case heard after this matter, 
Coronel v Fleetwood Homes of Idaho, (IIC 2008-229252), the Commission reviewed its 
file with a further focus on the concerns that Claimant has raised here and under their 
similar legal analysis an order compelling discovery and requiring the Claimant to 
respond to an inquiry regarding his immigration status was upheld. See copy set forth 
as Exhibit A. 
Claimant has put the cart before the horse in this appeal. Almost his whole 
argument here is centered around the Commission's previous holding in the Diaz matter 
as opposed to the Commission's power to make the Claimant comply with this discovery 
request. The holding of the Diaz case itself is not at issue here. Claimant has no 
impairment arising out of the 2008 case due to the causation opinion of the Commission. 
There was no impairment arising out of the 2004 injury. DiazlPPD has never became an 
actual issue in this case. Disability in excess of impairment won't ever be an issue in this 
case unless this Court were to overturn the Commission's ruling on causation and the 
discovery sanction orders. A decision on whether a defendant can conduct a discovery 
investigation into a Claimant's legal right to work should be subordinate to an opinion on 
the Commission's causation decision in this case. Otherwise an opinion on the discovery 
issue, at least in this case, is no more than dicta. Without the condition for which claimant 
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seeks benefits being compensable claimant is not entitled to any award for physical 
impairmenUdisability. The only way impairment and or permanent disability become an 
issue in this case in front of the Industrial Commission is if this Court over turns the 
Industrial Commission's decision with regard to the causation issue. 
The Commission has determined that a claimant's immigration status is a "relevant" 
factor in determining whether the claimant suffers from permanent disability as a result of 
his industrial injury. Accordingly, where permanent disability is an issue raised in a 
complaint, it is appropriate for the defendants in a case to conduct an investigation into the 
claimant's immigration status. See Diaz v. Franklin Building Supply, 2009 IIC 0652 
(November 20,2009). The narrow issue on appeal here is simply whether the Commission 
committed error in striking any allegation of PPO for not complying with the Commissions 
order to answer discovery questions regarding to Claimant's lawful ability to 
work/im migration status. 
In his Opening Brief before this Court, Claimant contends, as he did previously 
before the Commission in his numerous duplicative motions below including his Motion for 
Protective Order, Motion for Reconsideration, and Renewed Motion for Protective 
Order/Reconsideration/Sanctions, that allowing a defendant to inquire into claimant's 
immigration status where permanent disability is a noticed issue: 1) conflicts with Ninth 
Circuit case law; 2) violates Claimant's Fifth Amendment rights; 3) is against legislative 
intent because Title 72 does not expressly exclude undocumented aliens from entitlement 
to PPO; 4) would cause Claimant to be subjected to a "secondary investigation;" 5) would 
unjustly enrich employers; 6) would lead to employers purposefully hiring employees that 
give the appearance of being undocumented; 7) places employers in danger of criminal 
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prosecution; 8) implicates underwriting practices thus leading to lawsuits against sureties 
by their policy holders; and, 9) has led to an incorrect conclusion that there is no labor 
market in Idaho for undocumented workers. Claimant's Opening Brief, p. 3-34; A.R. Vol. I, 
p. 6-24,42-48, 58-61, 66 -70, 71-72, 73-75, 86-96, 142-148. 
As indicated above, the Commission has held that a Claimant's legal ability to work 
is a necessary and "relevant" component of a request for PPO benefits. Claimant often 
cites to the Diaz dissent authored by Commissioner Thomas Baskin, for the proposition 
that Diaz was wrongly decided and the dissent somehow supports Claimant's position, Le., 
"The facts to be weighed in conSidering whether or not to permit discovery of immigration 
status are complex. Many of those factors are lucidly discussed in the dissent in Diaz." 
Claimant's Opening Brief, p. 11. More important to the discovery sanction issue however 
is the fact that each and every Order issued by the Commission denying Claimant's 
motions contains the signature of Commissioner Baskin. A.R. Vol. I, p. 50, 85, 140, 160; 
Vol. II, p. 278. In fact, the September 7, 2010, Order, signed by all three 
commissioners, specifically states: 
The Commission's recent decision in Diaz v. Franklin Building Supply, IIC 
(November 20, 2009) illustrates the intersection of a claimant's legal status 
and the determination of the claimant's permanent partial disability (PPO) 
benefits. In Diaz, Claimant sought PPO benefits in excess of his physical 
impairment. Claimant openly acknowledged that he was present illegally in 
the U.S. and had no legal access to the Idaho or U.S. labor markets. The 
Commission ruled that Claimant was foreclosed from pursuing a claim for 
disability benefits in excess of permanent physical impairment due, in part, 
to the fact that he could not be legally employed in the United States. Diaz 
established, at the very ieast, that an injured worker's immigration siatus is 
relevant to the issue of disability as one of the several "non-medical factors" 
the Commission is required to consider in making the disability assessment. 
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A.R. Vol. I, p. 78-79 (emphasis added). Regarding Claimant's contention that compelling 
disclosure of his immigration status violates his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, the 
Commission, quoting Lester v. Salvino, 141 Idaho 937, 940 (Idaho App. 2005), stated: 
Unlike a criminal defendant who may invoke the Fifth Amendment right to 
remain silent and force the state to prove its case, a civil litigant may be 
compelled, by the rules of discovery, to divulge unprivileged information that 
will aid his or her opponent. Rule 26(b)(1) permits parties to "obtain 
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the 
subject matter involved in the pending action ... " 
A.R. Vol. I, p. 83. Therefore, as discussed above, the Commission did not commit legal 
error or abuse its discretion by denying Claimant's Motion for Protective Order, Motion for 
Reconsideration, and Renewed Motion for Protective Order/Reconsideration/Sanctions. 
Under the Commission's rulings a persons legal ability to work has bee determined to be a 
"relevant" non-medical factor and because it is "relevant" defendants are properly entitled 
to discovery responses on the topic. Therefore the holding in Lester v. Salvino, supra, is 
dispositive of this argument unless this Court were to decide, sua sponte, that legal ability 
to work is not a relevant factor as the Commission has determined. 
B. THE COMMISSION DID NOT COMMIT LEGAL ERROR OR ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY STRIKING CLAIMANT'S CLAIM FOR DISABILITY BENEFITS 
AS A SANCTION FOR CLAIMANT'S REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH ITS 
SEPTEMBER 7, 2010, ORDER COMPELLING DISCOVERY 
Under the Commission's broad rules of discovery,3 Defendant's discovery requests 
regarding Claimant's legal status are permitted. Claimant repeatedly refused to respond to 
Defendant's interrogatory requests, ciaiming a purported entitiement to the privilege of the 
Fifth Amendment. Pursuant to JRP 16, the Commission has retained the "power to 
impose appropriate sanctions for any violation or abuse of its rules or procedures." 
3 See JRP 7(c) which provides that procedural matters relating to discovery, except sanctions, shall be 
controlled by the appropriate provisions of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. A. R. Vol. I, p. 83. 
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Although reluctant to impose sanctions upon parties, the Commission tried other means to 
resolve the discovery disputes between the parties. However, after repeatedly urging 
Claimant to comply with Defendant's reasonable discovery requests, and repeatedly 
ordering Claimant to comply with Defendant's discovery requests on the matter, Claimant 
continued to refuse. A. R. Vol. I, p. 83. Thus, the Commission determined that an 
appropriate sanction for Claimant's refusal to comply with the Order Compelling Discovery 
was the dismissal of his claim for disability benefits from consideration. A.R. Vol. I, p. 84-
85. This Court has previously upheld the Commission's imposition of sanctions, including 
termination of benefits, when a claimant refused to respond to questions about her past or 
present medical conditions at an IME. See, Brewer v. LaCrosse Health and Rehab, 138 
Idaho 859, 71 P.3d 458 (2003). The Commission properly sanctioned Claimant for his 
refusal to comply with Defendants' relevant and reasonable discovery requests. 
C. THE COMMISSION DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING AND 
CONSIDERING THE DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF DR. TIMOTHY DOERR 
OVER CLAIMANT'S OBJECTIONS 
Claimant next argues that the Commission's admission and consideration of the 
deposition testimony of Dr. Timothy Doerr over Claimant's objections is legal error or an 
abuse of discretion. In his Opening Brief, Claimant inexplicably states as follows: 
In the matter currently before the Court Defendants admitted in their answer 
dated January 22, 2009 and in their answer dated the 27th of July 2011 
that Claimant's condition for which benefits are claimed was partly caused 
by an accident arising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment 
and failed to allege that any pre-existing condition might be the cause 
of Claimant's medical condition. 
Claimant's Opening Brief, p. 43. However, Defendants' Answer to Complaint No. 2008-
004757, dated July 27, 2011, clearly identifies as an issue, "Whether Claimant's current 
condition is causally related to the industrial accident or is related to a pre-existing or 
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subsequent injury or condition." A.R. Vol. II, p. 285 (emphasis added). Claimant alleges 
the defense of a pre-existing condition was a new theory, introduced by Dr. Doerr for the 
first time. Despite Claimant's protestations to the contrary, Claimant was obviously aware 
of the pre-existing issue, as evidenced not only by listing Dr. Doerr as a treating physcian 
on the July 27,2011 Complaint, but by offering into evidence at hearing Claimant's Exhibit 
J, containing Dr. Doerr's chart note, dated over three years prior to hearing, specifically 
discussing Claimant's back pain as secondary to his degenerative changes at L5-S1 I!! 
Claimant apparently believes that by admitting that he did not prepare for, anticipate, or 
hire experts to address the existence of the pre-existing degenerative condition, he has 
convinced this Court he had no advance knowledge of the issue. Claimant's Opening 
Brief, p. 44; A.R. Vol. II, p. 283; CI. Exh. J, p. 52. 
As discussed above, challenges to evidentiary rulings are reviewed under the 
abuse of discretion standard. Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 134 Idaho 
46,50,995 P.2d 816, 820 (2000) (citing Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825,827,828 P.2d 
854,856 (1992)). In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, (hereinafter, the 
"Decision"), the Commission overruled all objections posed during depositions. A.R. Vol. II, 
p. 312. Further, the Commission specifically, and in minute detail, discussed its rationale 
for overruling Claimant's objection posed during Dr. Doerr's deposition, which objection 
Claimant then renewed in his Closing Brief. Claimant objected to Dr. Doerr's deposition 
testimony, arguing that the opinions expressed therein were beyond the facts known and 
opinions held by Dr. Doerr as revealed in the course of discovery. Claimant also argued 
that Dr. Doerr's testimony should be excluded because Dr. Doerr testified without giving 
due consideration to Claimant's condition and medical records after September 16, 2008. 
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Importantly, the Commission indicated its belief that to properly address Claimant's 
objection it was necessary to provide a seven-page detailed review and examination of the 
procedural history of the case Id., p. 312-319 (reviewing the procedural history of the 
claim). 
Included in the Commission's discussion of its rationale for overruling Claimant's 
objection to the admission of Dr. Doerr's deposition testimony, was the following 
statement: 
On July 28, 2011, at hearing, Claimant objected to inclusion of Defendants' 
Exhibit L, an independent medical examination (IME) report by Dr. Richard 
Silver. Though Defendants ultimately withdrew Exhibit L for other reasons, it 
is worth examining Claimant's objection at length, as it is essentially 
identical to his current objection regarding Dr. Doerr's testimony. 
A.R., Vol. II, p. 315. At hearing, Claimant objected to Defense Exhibit L (the Silver IME 
report), as well as Defendants' Notice of Deposition of Dr. Silver, arguing that Defendants 
had failed to comply with I.R.C.P. Rule 26 for disclosure of expert witnesses. Claimant's 
objections were overruled after Claimant's counsel admitted Defendants had previously 
identified Dr. Silver as a potential expert witness and had also provided a copy of Dr. 
Silver's report during the discovery process as early as April, 2009. Id., p. 316-318. 
Defendants ultimately withdrew Dr. Silver's report because he died prior to hearing 
and could not provide post-hearing deposition testimony. Id. However, on August 3, 
2011, when Defendants filed an amended notice to take Dr. Doerr's deposition, Claimant, 
relying on LR.E. 705 and I.R.C.P. 26, raised the same objection previously raised and 
overruled at hearing as to Dr. Silver. Claimant contended that any expert opinion stated 
by Dr. Doerr would be beyond the scope of discovery, because the nature of the opinion 
was not detailed in discovery. The Commission dealt with this objection by discussing the 
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holding in Watson v. Joslin Millwork, 149 Idaho 850, 243 P.3d 666 (2010). Essentially, 
this Court has ruled that, in workers' compensation cases, it is permissible for experts to 
provide greater detail and explanation in their testimony than was previously provided in 
reports or medical records, and even to state opinions that were not explicitly stated 
before, as long as the conclusions are based on evidence in the record and may be 
reasonably inferred from earlier records or reports. 
The Commission found that Claimant's reliance on I.R.E. 705 was misplaced, as 
strict adherence to the rules of evidence is not required in Industrial Commission 
proceedings. Hagler v. Micron Technology, 118 Idaho 596, 598, 798 P.2d 55, 57 
(1990)(emphasis in original). The Commission continued the analysis, stating as follows: 
Likewise, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not normally apply in 
Commission cases. Page v. McCain Foods, 145 Idaho 302, 311, 179 P.3d 
265, 274 (2008). Rather, the Commission's Judicial Rules of Practice and 
Procedure govern worker's compensation cases. IDAPA 17.01.01.021. See 
also Idaho Code 72-508. However, JRP 7(C) states that procedural matters 
relating to discovery shall be "contro"ed by the appropriate provisions of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." Rule 26 is a discovery provision and 
therefore applies. 
A.R., Vol II, p. 318. Claimant argues that failure to meet the requirements of Rule 26 
typically results in the exclusion of the proffered evidence. Claimant cites White v. Mock, 
140 Idaho 882, 888 (2004), in support of his argument, however the facts of that case 
have no similarity to the instant case. White v. Mock involves a contract dispute wherein 
the Idaho Supreme Court determined the plaintiff was not entitled to call defendant 
vendors' expert witness on existence and types of mold (who vendors had identified as a 
rebuttal witness) as a witness to establish Plaintiff's prima facie case, where before trial 
White had merely made a general "reservation of rights" to call vendors' witnesses at trial. 
An evidentiary ruling, such as whether to exclude undisclosed expert testimony, is 
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committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Duspiva v. Fillmore, 293 P.3d 651 
(2013) (citing Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 180,219 P.3d 1192,1196 (2009). When 
reviewing a lower court or agency's discretionary decision, this Court must conduct a 
three-part inquiry to determine whether the lower court or agency abused its discretion. 
Acknowledging the Magee inquiry, the Commission stated as follows: 
Thus, Rule 26 "unambiguously imposes a continuing duty to supplement 
responses to discovery with respect to the substance and subject matter of 
an expert's testimony." However, the decision whether to exclude 
undisclosed expert testimony is "committed to the sound discretion of the 
trial court," or here, the Commission. In considering how to exercise its 
discretion, the Commission should act within the "outer boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices available. The decision whether to exclude should be reached by 
an exercise of reason." 
A.R. Vol. II, p. 320-321 (internal citations omitted). The Commission determined that 
Defendants had not violated Rule 26 by failing to disclose Dr. Doerr's opinion, as Dr. 
Doerr, like Dr. Silver, was disclosed by Defendants in April, 2009, as a potential witness 
who might provide opinion testimony. The Commission then referred to Commissioner 
Baskin's statement at hearing that Defendants had complied with the spirit of Rule 26, 
finding that compliance applied to their disclosures regarding Dr. Doerr as we" as to the 
disclosures regarding Dr. Silver. Further, the Commission found that the opinions to which 
Dr. Doerr ultimately testified were essentially the same as the opinions set forth in his 
records, previously disclosed to Claimant. 
As indicated above, the Commission next considered this Court's application of 
Rule 26 in workers' compensation cases, essentially that it is permissible for experts to 
provide greater detail and explanation in their testimony than was previously provided in 
reports or medical records, and even to state opinions that were not explicitly stated 
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before, as long as the conclusions are based on evidence in the record and may be 
reasonably inferred form earlier records or reports. Watson v. Joslin MHfwork, 149 Idaho 
850,857-858,243 P.3d 666, 673-674 (2010). 
By admitting Dr. Doerr's testimony, the Commission did not abuse its discretion 
because it (1) correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, (2) acted within the bounds of 
discretion and applied the correct legal standards, and (3) reached the decision through an 
exercise of reason. Magee v. Thompson Creek Min. Co., 152 Idaho 196, 200,268 P.3d 
464,468 (2012) (citing West Wood Invs., Inc., v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75,82,106 P.3d 401, 
408 (2005». 
D. THE COMMISSION'S FACTUAL DETERMINATION THAT CLAIMANT FAILED 
TO PROVE THE CONDITION FOR WHICH HE CLAIMED BENEFITS WAS 
CAUSED EITHER BY HIS 2004 OR HIS 2008 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTAND 
THEREFORE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL BENEFITS IS 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
Claimant must establish a probable, not merely possible, connection between 
cause and effect to support his contention. This, as clearly articulated by the Commission, 
Claimant has failed to do. 
Treating physician for the 2004 accident, Dr. Johnston, opined that Claimant's back 
pain was mostly related to degenerative changes that pre-existed the 2004 accident and 
deemed Claimant MMI without any permanent impairment attributed to this accident in 
June, 2004. Claimant testified that he returned to his time of injury position and worked full 
time until his next accident on January 28, 2008. Thus, there is substantial and competent 
evidence of record to support Dr. Johnston's conclusion that Claimant attained medical 
stability in June, 2004. Claimant relies on the medical records of Dr. Thompson to argue 
his causation case. The Commission clearly articulated its reasoning for declining to 
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agree, stating that her medical records contained conclusory statements insufficient to 
draw clear lines supported by well-reasoned analysis to connect Claimant's accidents to 
his disc herniation and his disc herniation to his pain, where the record contains conflicting 
evidence. 
Fo"owing his second accident on January 28, 2008, Claimant was treated first by 
Dr. Verska. Dr. Verska obtained an MRI of Claimant's lumbar spine in February, 2008, 
which showed no change from the 2004 MRI. These two diagnostic reports are 
substantial and competent evidence that Claimant's 2008 accident did not cause or 
worsen his pre-existing herniated disc. 
Dr. Doerr treated Claimant from April to September 8, 2008. When physical 
therapy and epidural steroid injections did not improve Claimant's symptoms, Dr. Doerr 
obtained two discograms, the first of which was inconclusive and the second, by Dr. 
Binegar, which raised significant concerns about the reliability of Claimant's presentation 
and his nonorganic symptoms. A third MRI obtained in October, 2008, showed no 
significant change from either the 2004 or February, 2008 MRI. Based upon Claimant's 
behavior during the discograms, his unreliable presentations and nonorganic symptoms 
(mentioned by Dr. Doerr, Dr. Rogers, Dr. Binegar and Dr. Thompson) as well as 
Claimant's wholly unsupported hearing testimony that three physicians had recommended 
surgery, the Commission determined that Claimant was not completely credible. Because 
the only evidence that Claimant's condition worsened after his 2008 accident was 
Claimant's subjective complaints, the Commission determined that Claimant failed to 
prove that the condition for which he claimed benefits was caused either by his 2004 or 
2008 industrial accidents. The Commission properly determined that because Claimant 
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failed to meet his burden of proving causation, he was unable to prove entitlement to 
any additional benefits. "The Industrial Commission, as the factfinder, is free to 
determine the weight to be given to the testimony of a medical expert." Eacret v. 
Clearwater Forest Industries, 136 Idaho 733, 737, 40 P.3d 91, 95 (2002). 
E. THE COMMISSION DID NOT COMMIT LEGAL ERROR OR ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY ISSUING ITS JULY 8, 2013 ORDER REGARDING 
CLAIMANT'S REQUEST TO AUGMENT THE RECORD 
Claimant filed his Objection and Motion to Augment the Record on June 18, 2013, 
requesting numerous items be included in the agency record in addition to those 
automatically included under I.A.R. 28. A.R., Vol., II, p. 354-57. In his Opening Brief, 
Claimant contends that, while "the Commission responded by augmenting the record to 
include the majority of Claimant's requests, excluding transcripts and audio of the 
telephonic hearings stating they were not in their possession, the Commission's Order 
Regarding Claimant's Request to Augment the Record makes no mention of the July 28th 
hearing request for audio, etc." Claimant's Opening Brief, p. 49. Claimant asserts, citing 
Small v. Jacklin Seed Company, 109 Idaho 541,544 (1985), that this requires the case to 
be remanded back to the Commission for reconsideration due to "inadequacies of the 
record." Id. 
Despite Claimant's assertions to the contrary, an accurate reading of the 
Commission's July 8, 2013 Order, supports the conclusion that all of Claimant's requests 
were either granted, or were otherwise addressed by the Order. Specifically, the Order 
states in pertinent part, as follows: 
The [July 28, 2011J hearing transcript and exhibits, whether admitted or not, 
wi" be lodged with the Court, as required by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
There is no need for duplication in the agency record. There are no 
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transcripts or audio recordings for the telephone conferences that occurred 
on July 27,2011, December 21,2010, and August 12,2010. Any motions, 
orders or other documents related to those telephone conference are part of 
the Commission's legal file and have already been included in the agency 
record .... The remaining items to which Claimant refers either do not exist or 
are not in the Commission's possession. 
A.R., Vol. II, p. 359-360. The transcript of the hearing held on July 28, 2011 was 
automatically lodged with the Court as required by the Idaho Appellate Rules. There is no 
basis for Claimant's contention that the Commission committed legal error or abused its 
discretion by "denying the items requested in Claimant's objection and motion to augment 
the record filed on the 18th of June, 2013." I.A.R. 28; A.R. Vol. I, p. i. 
Under the Idaho Appellate Rules, it is questionable whether Claimant is even 
entitled to have "audio" of hearings included in the record. 4 The sole reference to "audio" 
4 IAR 28 (a) provides that the parties are responsible for designating the documents which will compromise 
the clerk's record on appeal. The standard record described in subsection (b) is not designed to include many 
items i.e., motions for summary judgment, affidavits, jury instructions, etc., which may be pertinent to the 
appeal in a specific case. Parties are encouraged to designate a clerk's or agency's record more limited 
than the standard record. 
IAR 28 (b )(3) The clerk's or agency's record shall automatically include the following pleadings and 
documents in administrative proceedings: 
A. Any order sealing all or any portion of the record. 
B. Any original or amended complaint, petition, application or other initial pleading. 
C. Any answer or response thereto. 
D. All documents relating to an application or petition to intervene. 
E. Any protest or other oppositions filed by a party. 
F. A certificate listing all exhibits offered, whether or not admitted. 
G. The findings of fact, conclusions of law, or if none, any memorandum decision entered by the agency. 
H. The final decision, order or award. 
I. Petitions for rehearing or reconsiderations or orders thereon. 
J. Notice of appeal and any notice of cross-appeal. 
K. Any request for additional reporters' transcripts or agency's record. 
L. Table of contents and index. 
IAR 28 (c) Additional documents. The clerk's or agency's record shall also include all additional documents 
requested by any party in the notice of appeal, notice of cross-appeal and requests for additional documents 
in the record. Any party may request any written document filed or lodged with the district court or agency 
to be included in the clerk's or agency's record including, but not limited to written requested jury instructions, 
written jury instructions given by the court, depositions, briefs, statements or affidavits considered by the court 
or administrative agency in the trial of the action or proceedings, or considered on any motion made therein, 
and memorandum opinions or decisions of a court or administrative agency. 
IAR 28 (d) Preparation of record. The clerk shall prepare the record on paper by making clearly and 
distinctly legible photocopies or other reproductions of all documents included in the record. The clerk shall 
type or have typed any document which cannot be reproduced in a distinctly legible form. 
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and "recordings" resides in I.A.R. 31 (a), regarding "audio and audio-visual recordings 
offered or played during the proceedings.5 The Commission did not have audio recordings 
of the telephone conferences but all of their orders from such conferences are in the 
record. A.R., Vol. II, p. 359. 
F. CLAIMANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES 
Regardless of the outcome of the issue on appeal, Defendants should not be 
ordered to pay attorney fees. I.C. §72-804 fees are only payable when the Commission, 
or any Court hearing a workers compensation proceeding, determines that the employer 
or surety contested the claim for compensation "without reasonable grounds." Claimant 
has failed to show that Defendants unreasonably denied or delayed payment of attorney 
fees. Further, Defendants clearly have reasonable grounds to ask the Court to affirm the 
Industrial Commission's ruling that Claimant failed to meet his burden of proving that the 
condition for which he claimed benefits was caused either by his 2004 or 2008 industrial 
accident. 
G. DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR AN AWARD OF COSTS ON APPEAL UNDER 
I.A.R.41 SHOULD BE GRANTED 
Claimant has characterized the issues to be determined by this Court as being 
issues of law. Claimant's Opening Brief, p. 2. However, the seminal issue here is actually 
one of fact, that is, whether there was substantial, competent evidence to support the 
Commission's finding. As previously articulated by this Court: 
5 IAR 31 (a) Lodging with Supreme Court. The clerk of the district court or administrative agency shall iodge all 
of the following exhibits, recordings and documents with the Supreme Court. (1) Copies of all requested 
documents, charts and pictures offered or admitted as exhibits in a trial or hearing in a civil case ... (2) All 
records and transcripts filed with the district court or administrative agency (3) All transcripts from the 
magistrate's division of the district court (4) All audio and audio-visual recordings offered or played 
during the proceedings. 
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... [C]osts are properly awarded when an appeal asks this Court to do 
nothing more than reweigh the evidence submitted to the Commission. 
Duncan v. Navajo Trucking, 134 Idaho 202, 204; 998 P.2d 1115, 1117 (2000) (citing Baker 
v. Louisiana Pacific Corporation, 123 Idaho 799,803,853 P.2d 544, 547 (1993). 
CONCLUSION 
As previously set forth, Defendants respectfully pray that this Court not 
disturb the Commission's findings of fact regarding the weight of the medical evidence 
because the Commission's findings regards medical causation are not clearly 
erroneous and are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Additionally the 
Court should find that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in the rendering of 
sanctions for not complying with appropriate discovery orders. 
Further, Defendants request this Court award costs on appeal to Defendants. 
Respectfully submitted this \lJ-\-l:; day of November, 2013. 
LAW OFFICES OF KENT W. DAY 
~ ~ ,t,,\/ By: _____ VV'\. ___ -tl-d-r--_____ _ 
Kent W. Day 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the IV)~ day of November, 2013, I caused a copy 
of the foregoing RESPONSIVE BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS to be 
served by first class mail, postage prepaid, upon the following: 
Richard L. Hammond 
Attorney at Law 
811 East Chicago Street 
Caldwell, 10 83605 
Kent W. Day 
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ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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On April 5, 2011, Claimant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, requesting reconsideration of Referee Just's Order 
filed April 4, 201l. Claimant requests a hearing and the opportunity to provide oral argument to the Commis-
sioners on the matter. Defendants filed a response objecting to Claimant's request for reconsideration on April 27, 
201l. On July 19, 2011, Claimant filed another supplemental memorandum in support of his request for recon-
sideration. The Commission did not consider this additional late filing. 
In this case, Claimant has declined to provide Defendants with a response to discovery intended to ascertain 
Claimant's immigration status. The Referee's Order compelled Claimant to respond fully to Defendants' discovery 
requests. The Referee warned Claimant that the failure to comply with the discovery requests could result in 
sanctions, including the dismissal of Claimant's claim for disability in excess of impairment (hereinafter "disa-
bility" or "PPD"). 
Claimant submitted a cogent and articulate brief with secondaty sources for the Commission to consider. 
Claimant argues that the Commission should grant a protective order to prevent Defendants from discovering 
information concerning the Claimant's citizenship or immigration status. Claimant's most persuasive argument is 
that compelling Claimant to disclose information relevant to his immigration status over his asse11ion of his 
privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment violates his constitutional rights, and that public 
policy warrants granting his motion for a protective order. Claimant also requests a hearing before the Commis-
sioners for oral argument. 
Defendants argue that the Commission should not grant Claimant's requested protective order, as Claimant's immi-
gration status is relevant to consideration of Claimant's access to the labor market for calculation of his entitlement to 
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PPD benefits. Further, Claimant's claim for PPD is voluntarily made. Defendants note that had Claimant simply filed 
a claim for medical benefits or for physical impairment, Claimant's immigration status would not be relevant. De-
fendants argue that they have not failed to timely raise illegality as an affirmative defense, because Claimant bears the 
burden of proof concerning his immigration status. That is, Defendants argue that the burden of proof does not switch 
from Claimant to Defendants-Claimant must prove lost earning capacity by loss of access to the labor market, and 
Claimant must answer their reasonable discovery requests. Defendants argue that they have only requested infor-
mation that has bearing on whether Claimant is lawfully present and whether Claimant may lawfully work in the 
United States. Defendants contend that nothing in their requests for information asks Claimant to identify information 
that would demonstrate fraud or other criminal activity. 
THE COMMISSION HAS AUTHORITY TO CONSIDER THE MOTION 
*2 As a preliminary matter, Claimant has challenged an interlocutory order from a Commission referee. Under Idaho 
Code § 72-506(2), an order made by a referee is not an order of the Commission unless it is "approved and confirmed" 
by the Commission. This statute establishes the Commission's authority to review the orders of a referee; otherwise, 
the Commission would not be able to approve and confirm such orders. The process by which a party may seek 
Commission review of a referee's order is not expressly outlined by statute or rule. Review may be sought by means of 
a motion for reconsideration filed after the Commission has issued its decision in the case. See Wheaton v. ISIF. 129 
Idaho 538,928 P.2d 42 (1996) and Simpson v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 134 Idaho 209, 998 P.2d 1122 (2000). Gen-
erally, however, the Commission prefers that challenges to interlocutory orders of a referee be made in the parties' 
post-hearing briefs, before the final decision has been issued. 
There are some circumstances that justify earlier consideration of a challenge to a referee's order. These circumstances 
are similar to those that would compel the Idaho Supreme Court to consider an interlocutory appeal. Pre-hearing 
review is appropriate where the challenge "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial 
grounds for difference of opinion," and when immediate consideration of the challenge "may materially advance the 
orderly resolution of the litigation."See Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 118 Idaho 147, 149, 795 P.2d 309. 311 
(1990). 
Such circumstances exist in this case. Claimant's motion raises a significant question about the propriety of Defend-
ants' requested discovery. Furthermore, the Commission's decision to confirm or overturn the Referee's Order could 
have a substantial impact on the type of evidence presented at hearing. Thus, Claimant's motion is best addressed 
before the hearing occurs. The Commission has authority to consider Claimant's motion under Idaho Code § 72-506(2) 
and J.R.P. 3(E)(l), which permits an "application to the Commission for an order."The Commission will now discuss 
the arguments from the parties. 
DISCUSSION 
In another recent case, the Commission has found that the refusal to disclose legal status in Claimant's workers' 
compensation proceeding for permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits may result in the Commission striking 
PPD as a hearing issue, as a sanction against Claimant for refusing to comply with a reasonable discovery request. 
Claimant criticizes our Serrano order which held that claimant was not entitled to additional protections relating 
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to disclosure of his legal status, because deportation is a civil matter. See, Serrano v. Four Seasons Framing, Inc., 
2004 lIC 501845. Claimant's argument is that the Commission neglected to address the additional criminal 
prosecution risks he faces beyond civil deportation, i.e. criminal prosecution for false use of a Social Security 
number, identity fraud, etc. Therefore, Claimant believes that the hazard of self-incrimination is real and appre-
ciable. 
*3 Defendants argue that the requests for infonnation do not give rise to the risk of criminal prosecution against 
the Claimant. Defendants have produced the following intelTogatories to show that their questions are nalTowly 
tailored to discover information about Claimant's ability to work in the United States. Defendants argue that their 
requests are appropriately centered on whether Claimant is lawfully present and whether Claimant may lawfully 
work in the United States. 
As a preliminary matter, the Commission is not persuaded that Defendants have waived an affirmative defense 
regarding Claimant's PPD benefits. Claimant has the burden of proving his entitlement to PPD benefits in excess 
of impairment. The Commission does not require Defendants to plead the immigration status of Claimant in its 
original answer. 
In order to have compensable disability under the workers' compensation laws, an employee must have a 
work-related injury that has caused him to "suffer a decrease in 'wage-earning capacity' as that capacity is af-
fected by the peliinent medical and non-medical factors."McCage v. JoAnn Stores, Inc., 145 Idaho 91, 97,175 P. 
3d 780, 786 (2007). Whether an employee's wage-earning capacity is permanently diminished and the extent of 
such diminishment are determined by an analysis of several factors, including the impact of the employee's in-
jury on the employee's ability to procure and hold employment and ability to compete in an open labor market 
within a reasonable geographical area. Idaho Code § 72-430; Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 33, 870 
P. 2d 1292 (1994). 
In Diaz v. Franklin Building Supply, IC 2006-50799 (2009), Diaz sought PPD benefits in excess of his physical 
impainnent. Diaz openly acknowledged that he was present illegally in the U.S. and had no legal access to the 
Idaho or U.S. labor markets. The Commission ruled that Diaz was foreclosed from pursuing a claim for disa-
bility benefits in excess of permanent partial impairment due, in part, to the fact that he could not be legally 
employed in the United States. As explained by the Commission's decision in Otero v. Briggs Roofing Company, 
IC 2007-16876 (filed August 12,2011), Diaz's illegal status was afactor that entirely eclipsed his in jUly-related 
impairment. Thus, Diaz sustained no disability in excess of impainnent. Second, when conducting a disability 
analysis, the Commission would not take into account the potential for illegal conduct. 
At no point in the decision did the Commission hold that Mr. Diaz was not entitled to permanent disability 
benefits simply because he was an undocumented worker. Rather, Mr. Diaz was not entitled to pennanent 
disability benefits because another factor, which happened to be illegal working status, "overshadowed and 
essentially rendered moot" his impainnent. 
Otero, supra, at 16. 
Every disability analysis requires consideration of an injured worker's relevant non-medical factors, and these 
factors have an important effect on the calculation of disability in excess of impainnent. The Commission finds it 
inappropriate to ignore evidence of Claimant's immigration status, or any other non-medical factors influencing 
Claimant's capacity to work, for that matter, relevant to evaluating Claimant's disability in excess of impairment. 
*4 As stated in Rule 7 of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law 
(JRP), "Procedural matters relating to discovery, except sanctions, shall be controlled by the appropriate provisions of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure."Rule 26(b)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows parties to obtain 
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discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. 
The Fifth Amendment, in relevant part, states that "no person shall '" be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself."The central standard for the privilege's application has been whether the claimant is confronted by 
substantial and 'real,' and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination." Marchetti v. U.S., 390 U.S. 39, 
2l.seeHiII v. Department of Employment. 108 Idaho 583 (1985). It has long been held that this prohibition not only 
pennits a person to refuse to testify against himself at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant, but also "privileges 
him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the 
answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings."Letkowitz v. Tudev, 414 U.S. 70, 77,94 S.Ct. 316, 322, 
38 L.Ed.2d 274, 281 (1973).Minnesota v. Murphv, 465 U.S. 420, 426, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1141, 79 L.Ed.2d 409.418 
(1984). 
"In determining whether such a real and appreciable danger of incrimination exists, a trial judge must ex-
amine the 'implications of the question[s] in the setting in which [they are] asked .... ' [Citations.] He '''[m]ust 
be governed as much by his personal perception of the peculiarities of the case as by the facts actually in 
evidence.'[Citations.] If the trial judge decides from this examination of the questions, their setting, and the 
peculiarities of the case, that no threat of self-incrimination exists, it then becomes incumbent 'upon the 
defendant to show that answers to [the questions] might criminate him.'[Citations.] This does not mean that 
the defendant must confess the crime he has sought to conceal by asserting the privilege. The law does not 
require him "'to prove guilt to avoid admitting it.'" [Citations.] But neither does the law pennit the defendant 
to be the final arbiter of his own assertion's validity. 'The witness is not exonerated from answeling merely 
because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself-his say-so does not of itself establish the 
hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to decide whether his silence is justified .... ' [Citations.]" 
Idaho State Tax Commission v. Peterson, 107 Idaho )60, 262, 688 P.2d 1165, 1167 (1984). 
The Commission will address each interrogatory and request for production of documents. 
INTERROGATORY NO.1: Please identify whether you are a citizen of the United States, and if not, 
whether you entered the United States legally. 
*5 As to the first aspect of Defendants' interrogatory, "[p] lease identify whether you are a citizen of the United 
States ... ," the Commission has found that Claimant's immigration status is relevant to the detennination of his 
request for permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits. Claimant's disclosure of his citizenship is relevant, but not 
without risks. While the Fifth Amendment protects individuals from being compelled to give a statement that may 
be used against them, the Fifth Amendment does not apply in circumstances where a claimant wishes to conceal 
her legal status to avoid deportation. See, United States v. Balsys, 542 U.S. 666, 671 (Balsys agrees that the risk 
that his testimony might subject him to deportation is not a sufficient ground for asserting the privilege, given the 
civil character of a deportation proceeding); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032. 1043-44 (1984); People v. 
Bolivar. 643 N.Y.S.2d 205 (l996}. In fact, a ciaimant's silence on his immigration status does not protect him in 
an immigration proceeding. 
Silence is often evidence of the most persuasive character '" [T]here is no rule oflaw which prohibits officers 
charged with the administration of the immigration law from drawing an inference from the silence of one 
who is called upon to speak .... A person arrested on the preliminary warrant is not protected by a presump-
tion of citizenship comparable to the presumption of innocence in a criminal case. There is no provision 
which forbids drawing an adverse inference from the fact of standing mute. 
INS v. Lopez-Mendoz, 468 U.S. at 1043-44 (quoting United States es reI. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. at 153-54.) 
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The Commission does not prosecute criminal actions, and we are primarily concerned with Claimant's workers' 
compensation case-particularly the Claimant's relevant medical and non-medical factors for calculation of the 
PPD benefits. The Commission is not the appropriate place to address long-standing federal and state laws about 
undocumented workers or immigration, although Claimant has certainly presented interesting policy concerns. 
The Commission has taken into account the peculiarities of this workers' compensation case and weighed the 
threat of self-incrimination. After reviewing the scenarios that Claimant has set forth, the Commission still finds 
that Claimant is not sufficiently implicated in any crimes by stating his immigration status as to warrant invoking 
the Fifth Amendment privilege, particularly taking into account the setting in which they are asked. 
As discussed above, Claimant's legal ability to work is a necessary and relevant component of his request for PPD 
benefits. Claimant has not adduced sufficient evidence or case law to show that deportation is a criminal proceeding 
entitled to the protections of the Fifth Amendment rather than a civil proceeding. Again, there is no presumption of 
citizenship. Claimant has not shown any specific hazard of incrimination or Fifth Amendment protection that would 
prevent the disclosure of his legal status to Defendants in this workers' compensation proceeding. Claimant may offer 
a simple response to the question, without commentary on ancillary matters. The Commission finds that this pali of 
Defendants' first interrogatory is appropriate and relevant. 
*6 The Commission finds the second part of the intelTogatory questionable. Defendants ask whether "Claimant 
entered the United States legally."The Commission does not need this infonnation to determine Claimant's enti-
tlement to disability benefits. The Commission is concerned about how this discovery request might expose 
Claimant to risks related to criminal matters, which are not germane to the workers' compensation proceeding. In 
an abundance of caution, the Commission will strike the second part of Defendant's interrogatory as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO.1: Please identify whether you are a citizen of the United States, «-and if not, 
whether you entered the United States legally.-» 
INTERROGATORY NO.2: Please identify and describe in detail whether you are legally entitled to work 
in the United States, including whether you have a work permit and the dates such work permit was in 
place. 
Defendants' interrogatory is meant to ascertain whether Claimant has access to the labor market in the future, 
which is a relevant inquiry, given the benefits Claimant is seeking. The question is whether the second interrog-
atory presents a substantial and 'real' risk of incrimination. 
Hypothetically, a claimant might be concerned that this question exposes him or her to prosecution for using a 
fraudulent work pennit or fraudulent use of a Social Security number. However, Defendants' second interrogatory 
is broadly worded and intended to discern whether Claimant can access the labor market in the future, as needed 
to calculate the disability benefits to which Claimant may be entitled. The Commission does not find that this 
question forces Claimant to produce falsified documents or evidence of fraud. 
Defendants' second interrogatory is narrowly tailored to Claimant's ability to work in the United States, and does 
not inappropriately delve into the elements characteristic of a criminal proceeding. Claimant may answer this 
interrogatory about his future access to the labor market without detailing or addressing past documents or ac-
tions. Therefore, the Commission will not alter Defendants' Interrogatory No.2. 
Defendants' last request for documents supporting Claimant's legal ability to work in the United States is included 
below: 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.1: Please provide any documents demonstrating your ability to le-
gally work in the United States. 
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Again, Claimant should produce any documents showing that he may legally access the labor market. Defendants' 
request does not assume that Claimant produced fraudulent documents, or require that Claimant produce evidence of 
fraudulent or criminal actions. Claimant may produce appropriate documents, or he may decline the pursuit ofPPD 
benefits which are based, in part, on Claimant's future access to the labor market. 
In defending the claim for disability benefits, Defendants are entitled to conduct discovery necessary to assess 
how Claimant's permanent partial impairment, combined with other non-medical factors, may have influenced his 
loss of earning capacity. Claimant's immigration status is a relevant factor, among many, that the Commission 
considers in evaluating Claimant's permanent disability. Claimant is aware, based on Commission precedent, that 
he will need to divulge his immigration status, if he wishes a Commission decision on his pernmnent partial 
disability. Defendants' request for the production of documents is appropriate, and does not violate Claimant's 
Fifth Amendment rights. 
*7 Even under Commissioner Baskin's dissent in Diaz v. Franklin Building Supply, IC 2006-50799 (2009), Claimant's 
immigration status and his legal entitlement to hold employment in the United States matter, and would need to be 
disclosed. The Diaz dissent argued that the Commission should examine the labor market for undocumented workers 
in this state for the calculation of permanent partial disability, rather than find a claimant ineligible for permanent 
partial disability benefits due to the claimant's status as an undocumented worker. 
The Commission has reviewed the file with a focus on the concerns that Claimant has raised and we maintain that 
the legal analysis suppOlis the order compelling discovery. Although Claimant disagrees, the Commission finds 
that Claimant has not presented persuasive argument to disturb the order compelling discovery. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, Claimant's Motion is DENIED. 
I 
Defendants' first interrogatory is changed as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO.1: Please identify whether you are a citizen of the United States, «-and if not, 
whether you entered the United States legally.-» 
Defendants' second interrogatory and Defendants' first request for production of documents are appropriate, as 
they concern Claimant's ability to access the labor market, and do not present a real and substantial risk to 
Claimant. 
II 
Claimant is hereby ORDERED to comply with Defendants' reasonable discovery requests. 
III 
Claimant's request for oral argument and a hearing is DENIED. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 23rd day of September, 2011. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Thomas E. Limbaugh 
Chairman 
Thomas P. Baskin 
Commissioner 
R.D. Maynard 
Commissioner 
ERRATUM ON ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Page 7 
On September 23, 2011, the Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the Commission in the 
above-entitled case. The following typographical errors should be changed as follows: 
On the Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, Page 1, the IC number, "IC 2008-029252" should be changed to 
read "IC 2008-026353." 
DATED this 30thday of September, 2011. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Thomas E. Limbaugh 
Chairman 
Thomas P. Baskin 
Commissioner 
R.D. Maynard 
Commissioner 
2011 WL4674786 (Idaho Ind.Com.) 
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